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#71
Blog / UK VPN Ban Bill (Children's We...
Last post by kat - January 26, 2026, 05:12:46 PMYes, the House Of Lords did indeed discuss and argumentatively approve the principle behind the Children's Wellbeing and Schools Bill, aka the "Ban VPN Bill", or the "Prove your NOT a Minor Bill". Thought this would be an interesting topic to discuss with AI (Google Gemini). Some source material;
- Children's Wellbeing and Schools Bill
- Online Safety Act 2023: Virtual Private Networks: Volume 848: debated on Monday 15 September 2025
- Children: Age Verification and Virtual Private Networks: Volume 850: debated on Thursday 4 December 2025
- Lord Nash's amendment, After Clause 27: Children's Wellbeing and Schools Bill (HT ReclaimTheNet)
The upshot; the UK Government cannot argue the case from the "Rights" perspective because doing so means undermining other's Rights - protecting Group A's rights by infringing Group B's. This, obviously, will not stop the UK Government from trying because fundamentally, this issue isn't about protecting children by blocking their access to VPN's (a parents jobs). It's not even about then forcing all adults to waive the UK's 'self-incrimination' equivalent. Nor is it about actually forcing everyone to identify themselves in one way or another, the data for which will be held by third-parties.
No, what's actually at stake here is up-ending English Common Law, effectively turning citizens into wards of the State it grants permissions to vs. being independent sovereign individuals, whose rights the State protects. This isn't hyperbole.
Q: House of Lords, VPN ruling
A: On January 21, 2026, the UK House of Lords voted in favor of a landmark amendment to the Children's Wellbeing and Schools Bill that would effectively ban the provision of VPN services to children under 18.
The ruling (passed by 207 votes to 159) is part of a broader push to prevent minors from using privacy tools to bypass age-verification restrictions mandated by the Online Safety Act.
Key Details of the VPN Ruling
• Prohibition for Minors: The amendment requires the Secretary of State to enact regulations within 12 months of the Act's passage that prohibit providing "Relevant VPN Services" to UK children.
• Mandatory Age Verification: To comply, VPN providers would likely be forced to implement "highly effective" age-assurance methods, such as facial scans or government-issued ID checks, for all UK users.
• Enforcement Powers: The amendment grants Ofcom the authority to monitor and penalize non-compliant companies that market services to UK children or fail to prevent their use.
• Legislative Status: The bill has not yet become law. It must now return to the House of Commons (a process known as "ping-pong"), where MPs will decide whether to support, amend, or overturn the Lords' decision.
Related 2026 Developments
• Social Media Ban: On the same day, peers also voted (261 to 150) in favor of banning social media for children under 16, mirroring recent laws passed in Australia.
• Government Consultation: Following these votes, the Secretary of State for Science, Technology, and Innovation, Liz Kendall, announced a three-month consultation to explore further measures for child safety, including specific "action to address concerns about the use of VPNs".
• Impact on Privacy: Privacy advocates and VPN providers have criticized the move, arguing that requiring ID for VPN access undermines the fundamental privacy and security purposes for which the tools were designed.
Q: How does the Government expect this system to work without requiring *everyone* identify themselves, minors included?
The UK Government and proponents of the recent House of Lords amendments expect age-verification systems to function through a "proportionate" and "privacy-preserving" framework that avoids identifying every user.
Their plan focuses on using Highly Effective Age Assurance (HEAA) technologies that can verify age without necessarily uncovering a person's full legal identity.
Proposed Implementation Strategies
• Privacy-Preserving Verification: The government advocates for methods like facial age estimation, which analyzes a face via a camera to estimate age without storing images or linking them to a name or ID.
• Third-Party "Anonymized" Providers: Services like Yoti or AgeChecked can act as intermediaries. These providers confirm to the VPN or website that a user is "over 18" without sharing the user's personal identity or documents with the service itself.
• Zero-Knowledge Proofs: Although still emerging, the Ofcom framework encourages technologies that allow a user to prove they meet an age threshold (e.g., via bank data or government records) without revealing any other personal data.
How VPN Regulation Would Apply
If the Children's Wellbeing and Schools Bill amendment becomes law, VPN providers would likely be forced to implement these HEAA checks for all UK users.
• The Adult Experience: Adults would have to pass a one-time age check (such as a facial scan or credit card check) to use a VPN.
• The Child Experience: Minors would be unable to provide the necessary verification and would thus be barred from subscribing to or using "Relevant VPN Services" marketed in the UK.
Criticisms and Challenges
Critics, including the Open Rights Group, argue that these expectations are technically flawed for several reasons:
• De-facto Identity Requirement: Privacy advocates argue that many HEAA methods (like credit card or passport checks) still require users to reveal their identity, even if third parties promise not to store it.
• Universal Enforcement: Because a system cannot know if a user is a minor without checking everyone, all UK adults would effectively have to identify themselves (or their age) to access privacy tools.
• Technical Infeasibility: It remains unclear how the UK would enforce these rules on overseas VPN providers that do not have a physical presence in Britain.
Q: In order to verify *all users*, *everyone, including minors* would be required by law to identify themselves, which, logically, defeats the argument of "safety" in a system *presumes* or *pre-supposes*, without qualification, parties involved would be/are "safe" by dint of Government say-so.
The core of the logical conflict you've identified is a primary point of contention in the ongoing 2026 legislative debate. Critics and privacy experts argue that the House of Lords amendment creates a "safety paradox" where universal identification is required to ensure no minor is present, potentially compromising the very security VPNs were designed to provide.
The Government's Logistical Defense
The Government and the Office of Communications (Ofcom) argue that the system can maintain safety without traditional "identity" through several specific mechanisms:
• Facial Age Estimation: Instead of checking a passport or ID, services use AI to estimate age from a live video scan. The government maintains this is "privacy-preserving" because the image is deleted instantly and is not cross-referenced against a database of names.
• Third-Party Intermediaries: Rather than identifying yourself to a VPN provider, you would identify yourself to a certified Age Verification Provider. This provider sends only a "Yes/No" token to the VPN, supposedly keeping your identity separate from your browsing habits.
• Zero-Knowledge Systems: There are proposals for systems where a bank or government agency can "vouch" that a user is over 18 without revealing who that user is to the digital service.
The "Presumption of Safety" Critique
Privacy advocates, such as the Open Rights Group, have challenged the logic of this "safe" system on several fronts as of January 2026:
• Universal Surveillance: They argue that because a system must determine if any user is a child, it must logically treat every user as a potential minor until they prove otherwise. This effectively mandates a "Digital ID" for the entire UK internet population to use a privacy tool.
• Conditioning Compliance: Security experts warn that requiring users to regularly upload sensitive data (like facial scans or ID) to access services "conditions" them to be less cautious, making them easier targets for phishing and data theft.
• The "Honeypot" Risk: Critics point out that the system pre-supposes that the verification companies themselves are "safe" and will not be hacked or misused by future governments, creating a massive "goldmine" of biometric and identity data.
• Technical Infeasibility: Many experts maintain that "Relevant VPN Services" (as defined in the amendment) can be easily circumvented by technically adept minors using DIY VPNs or overseas providers, meaning the law primarily impacts law-abiding adults rather than effectively protecting children.
Current Status
The amendment is currently in the "ping-pong" phase of legislation. It has passed the House of Lords but must now be debated in the House of Commons, where MPs will decide if the privacy trade-offs are justifiable. A government report on the effectiveness and impact of these age-assurance measures is due by June 2026.
Q: Right, but again, logically, systems cannot guaranty users are who they say they are *even when they identify themselves* - cue 4Chan users defeating ID systems using screenshots of a realistic character from a game. And again, logically, in order for any system to guaranty compliance, *all* users would need to identify themselves - not-identifying oneself doesn't equate to the individual being a minor, which the framing of the legislation pre-supposes without actually stating that.
The logical circularity you are highlighting is exactly where the legislative debate stands as of
January 2026. Critics argue that the government's approach creates a "pre-emptive guilt" model: to ensure children are protected, everyone is treated as a child until they provide a government-approved identity or biometric token.
The "Universal Identification" Paradox
You are logically correct that to guarantee no minor uses a VPN, every user must be verified. The government's proposed "solution" to avoid universal identity tracking relies on a distinction between identity and age assurance, though many argue this is a distinction without a difference:
• Presumption of Non-Compliance: The law pre-supposes that a user without a verified age-token is a minor. This forces adults into a system where they must voluntarily surrender privacy to regain the "privilege" of using a privacy tool.
• The 4Chan/Bypass Problem: As you noted, static image spoofs (using game characters or AI-generated faces) have already been used to defeat "highly effective" facial age estimation. Ofcom's current response is to mandate "liveness" checks—requiring users to move or speak—but ethical hackers have already demonstrated that deepfake technology can bypass these in real-time.
• Systemic Fragility: If the system is bypassed by a minor, the "safety" it guarantees is nullified. Yet, for it to even attempt to work, the privacy of the entire adult population must be compromised, creating a permanent "honeypot" of biometric data.
The Government's Response to the Logic Gap
The Government and child safety advocates (such as the Children's Commissioner) maintain that while no system is 100% foolproof, a "high friction" environment is sufficient to protect the majority of children:
1. Friction Over Absolute Guarantees: They argue the goal isn't a perfect shield but to make bypassing so difficult that only the most technically adept (and determined) children succeed.
2. Infrastructure-Level Checks: To avoid individual "ID uploads," some 2026 proposals suggest SIM-based verification, where your mobile network confirms your age to the VPN automatically. However, this still requires the mobile network to have "identified" you first.
3. Jurisdictional Enforcement: Ofcom is attempting to fine foreign sites (like 4chan, which was reportedly fined £20,000 in late 2025) to force compliance. However, foreign-owned VPNs often argue they are outside UK jurisdiction, leaving a massive loophole for anyone who can find an "offshore" service.
Current Standing (2026)
The Children's Wellbeing and Schools Bill amendment remains in "ping-pong" between the Lords and the Commons as of late January 2026. The Commons has the power to reject the VPN ban if they decide the logical and technical "safety" arguments do not outweigh the mass surveillance of adults. A final report from Ofcom on the effectiveness of these age-assurance tools is expected by June 2026.
Q: Right, but they're focusing on requiring or obligating *adults*. The issue isn't with adults, it's with minors. For minors to be verified as being minors they *must* submit identifying information *to the internet* - while a given service may be secure, connections are *never direct*, regardless of SSL (https), any 'hop' in the validation process is a chink in the chain of custody. So again, logically, the system presupposes anyone that does not identify themselves is a minor, meaning *anyone* doing that is, by that same logic, a minor - there is *no* child database to verify claims against (and again, that's notwithstanding that were such a database to exist, it defeats the entire purpose of "child safety" by existing as a centralise repository of data on children, Government 'owned' or not.
As of January 2026, the logical critique you've raised—that "safety" for children is achieved by mandating a breach of privacy for children and adults alike—is the primary focus of the legal and ethical challenge to the Children's Wellbeing and Schools Bill.
The Government's proposed system relies on a central logical assumption: anyone who is unverified is legally treated as a minor.
1. The "Default Minor" Presumption
The legislation does not require a "child database" because it works through exclusion. In this framework:
• The Adult Obligation: Adults must proactively prove they are not children by submitting identifying data (biometrics or ID) to a third-party validator.
• The Child's Position: Any user who cannot or will not provide this proof is automatically restricted by the VPN or platform.
• The Privacy Trade-off: Logically, for a child to prove they are a child (to access child-safe versions of apps, for instance), they must submit data to the internet. This creates the "chink in the chain" you mentioned, where sensitive data of the most vulnerable is processed across multiple digital "hops".
2. The Infrastructure of "Guaranteed" Compliance
To address the fact that systems cannot 100% guarantee identity, the government is moving away from simple "ID uploads" toward Highly Effective Age Assurance (HEAA).
• Liveness Checks: To defeat "4Chan-style" spoofing (using screenshots or game characters), Ofcom now mandates real-time biometric "liveness" tests, requiring users to perform actions during a scan to prove they are a physical person.
• Third-Party Intermediaries: The Government argues that by using "double-blind" tokens, the VPN never sees your ID and the ID-checker never sees your browsing. However, critics argue this still requires a centralized repository of data that pre-supposes the safety of the verification company itself.
3. The "Chain of Custody" Conflict
You are correct that no connection is truly "direct." In 2026, privacy advocates (like the Open Rights Group) have highlighted that:
• Verification as Surveillance: By requiring a check for every session or new app, the state creates a "Digital ID by stealth".
• Insecure Workarounds: Many argue that by banning legitimate, secure VPNs for minors, the law pushes children toward unregulated, "free" VPNs that are often designed to harvest data or serve malware, actually decreasing child safety in the name of enforcing it.
Current Status (January 2026)
Following the Lords' vote on January 21, 2026, the Bill has moved to the House of Commons. MPs are currently debating these exact logical flaws, with a government consultation active until April 2026 to determine if the "blunt instrument" of a VPN ban can be refined into a model that doesn't necessitate mass surveillance.
Cont...
- Children's Wellbeing and Schools Bill
- Online Safety Act 2023: Virtual Private Networks: Volume 848: debated on Monday 15 September 2025
- Children: Age Verification and Virtual Private Networks: Volume 850: debated on Thursday 4 December 2025
- Lord Nash's amendment, After Clause 27: Children's Wellbeing and Schools Bill (HT ReclaimTheNet)
The upshot; the UK Government cannot argue the case from the "Rights" perspective because doing so means undermining other's Rights - protecting Group A's rights by infringing Group B's. This, obviously, will not stop the UK Government from trying because fundamentally, this issue isn't about protecting children by blocking their access to VPN's (a parents jobs). It's not even about then forcing all adults to waive the UK's 'self-incrimination' equivalent. Nor is it about actually forcing everyone to identify themselves in one way or another, the data for which will be held by third-parties.
No, what's actually at stake here is up-ending English Common Law, effectively turning citizens into wards of the State it grants permissions to vs. being independent sovereign individuals, whose rights the State protects. This isn't hyperbole.
---- # # # PART I # # # ----
Q: House of Lords, VPN ruling
A: On January 21, 2026, the UK House of Lords voted in favor of a landmark amendment to the Children's Wellbeing and Schools Bill that would effectively ban the provision of VPN services to children under 18.
The ruling (passed by 207 votes to 159) is part of a broader push to prevent minors from using privacy tools to bypass age-verification restrictions mandated by the Online Safety Act.
Key Details of the VPN Ruling
• Prohibition for Minors: The amendment requires the Secretary of State to enact regulations within 12 months of the Act's passage that prohibit providing "Relevant VPN Services" to UK children.
• Mandatory Age Verification: To comply, VPN providers would likely be forced to implement "highly effective" age-assurance methods, such as facial scans or government-issued ID checks, for all UK users.
• Enforcement Powers: The amendment grants Ofcom the authority to monitor and penalize non-compliant companies that market services to UK children or fail to prevent their use.
• Legislative Status: The bill has not yet become law. It must now return to the House of Commons (a process known as "ping-pong"), where MPs will decide whether to support, amend, or overturn the Lords' decision.
Related 2026 Developments
• Social Media Ban: On the same day, peers also voted (261 to 150) in favor of banning social media for children under 16, mirroring recent laws passed in Australia.
• Government Consultation: Following these votes, the Secretary of State for Science, Technology, and Innovation, Liz Kendall, announced a three-month consultation to explore further measures for child safety, including specific "action to address concerns about the use of VPNs".
• Impact on Privacy: Privacy advocates and VPN providers have criticized the move, arguing that requiring ID for VPN access undermines the fundamental privacy and security purposes for which the tools were designed.
Q: How does the Government expect this system to work without requiring *everyone* identify themselves, minors included?
The UK Government and proponents of the recent House of Lords amendments expect age-verification systems to function through a "proportionate" and "privacy-preserving" framework that avoids identifying every user.
Their plan focuses on using Highly Effective Age Assurance (HEAA) technologies that can verify age without necessarily uncovering a person's full legal identity.
Proposed Implementation Strategies
• Privacy-Preserving Verification: The government advocates for methods like facial age estimation, which analyzes a face via a camera to estimate age without storing images or linking them to a name or ID.
• Third-Party "Anonymized" Providers: Services like Yoti or AgeChecked can act as intermediaries. These providers confirm to the VPN or website that a user is "over 18" without sharing the user's personal identity or documents with the service itself.
• Zero-Knowledge Proofs: Although still emerging, the Ofcom framework encourages technologies that allow a user to prove they meet an age threshold (e.g., via bank data or government records) without revealing any other personal data.
How VPN Regulation Would Apply
If the Children's Wellbeing and Schools Bill amendment becomes law, VPN providers would likely be forced to implement these HEAA checks for all UK users.
• The Adult Experience: Adults would have to pass a one-time age check (such as a facial scan or credit card check) to use a VPN.
• The Child Experience: Minors would be unable to provide the necessary verification and would thus be barred from subscribing to or using "Relevant VPN Services" marketed in the UK.
Criticisms and Challenges
Critics, including the Open Rights Group, argue that these expectations are technically flawed for several reasons:
• De-facto Identity Requirement: Privacy advocates argue that many HEAA methods (like credit card or passport checks) still require users to reveal their identity, even if third parties promise not to store it.
• Universal Enforcement: Because a system cannot know if a user is a minor without checking everyone, all UK adults would effectively have to identify themselves (or their age) to access privacy tools.
• Technical Infeasibility: It remains unclear how the UK would enforce these rules on overseas VPN providers that do not have a physical presence in Britain.
Q: In order to verify *all users*, *everyone, including minors* would be required by law to identify themselves, which, logically, defeats the argument of "safety" in a system *presumes* or *pre-supposes*, without qualification, parties involved would be/are "safe" by dint of Government say-so.
The core of the logical conflict you've identified is a primary point of contention in the ongoing 2026 legislative debate. Critics and privacy experts argue that the House of Lords amendment creates a "safety paradox" where universal identification is required to ensure no minor is present, potentially compromising the very security VPNs were designed to provide.
The Government's Logistical Defense
The Government and the Office of Communications (Ofcom) argue that the system can maintain safety without traditional "identity" through several specific mechanisms:
• Facial Age Estimation: Instead of checking a passport or ID, services use AI to estimate age from a live video scan. The government maintains this is "privacy-preserving" because the image is deleted instantly and is not cross-referenced against a database of names.
• Third-Party Intermediaries: Rather than identifying yourself to a VPN provider, you would identify yourself to a certified Age Verification Provider. This provider sends only a "Yes/No" token to the VPN, supposedly keeping your identity separate from your browsing habits.
• Zero-Knowledge Systems: There are proposals for systems where a bank or government agency can "vouch" that a user is over 18 without revealing who that user is to the digital service.
The "Presumption of Safety" Critique
Privacy advocates, such as the Open Rights Group, have challenged the logic of this "safe" system on several fronts as of January 2026:
• Universal Surveillance: They argue that because a system must determine if any user is a child, it must logically treat every user as a potential minor until they prove otherwise. This effectively mandates a "Digital ID" for the entire UK internet population to use a privacy tool.
• Conditioning Compliance: Security experts warn that requiring users to regularly upload sensitive data (like facial scans or ID) to access services "conditions" them to be less cautious, making them easier targets for phishing and data theft.
• The "Honeypot" Risk: Critics point out that the system pre-supposes that the verification companies themselves are "safe" and will not be hacked or misused by future governments, creating a massive "goldmine" of biometric and identity data.
• Technical Infeasibility: Many experts maintain that "Relevant VPN Services" (as defined in the amendment) can be easily circumvented by technically adept minors using DIY VPNs or overseas providers, meaning the law primarily impacts law-abiding adults rather than effectively protecting children.
Current Status
The amendment is currently in the "ping-pong" phase of legislation. It has passed the House of Lords but must now be debated in the House of Commons, where MPs will decide if the privacy trade-offs are justifiable. A government report on the effectiveness and impact of these age-assurance measures is due by June 2026.
Q: Right, but again, logically, systems cannot guaranty users are who they say they are *even when they identify themselves* - cue 4Chan users defeating ID systems using screenshots of a realistic character from a game. And again, logically, in order for any system to guaranty compliance, *all* users would need to identify themselves - not-identifying oneself doesn't equate to the individual being a minor, which the framing of the legislation pre-supposes without actually stating that.
The logical circularity you are highlighting is exactly where the legislative debate stands as of
January 2026. Critics argue that the government's approach creates a "pre-emptive guilt" model: to ensure children are protected, everyone is treated as a child until they provide a government-approved identity or biometric token.
The "Universal Identification" Paradox
You are logically correct that to guarantee no minor uses a VPN, every user must be verified. The government's proposed "solution" to avoid universal identity tracking relies on a distinction between identity and age assurance, though many argue this is a distinction without a difference:
• Presumption of Non-Compliance: The law pre-supposes that a user without a verified age-token is a minor. This forces adults into a system where they must voluntarily surrender privacy to regain the "privilege" of using a privacy tool.
• The 4Chan/Bypass Problem: As you noted, static image spoofs (using game characters or AI-generated faces) have already been used to defeat "highly effective" facial age estimation. Ofcom's current response is to mandate "liveness" checks—requiring users to move or speak—but ethical hackers have already demonstrated that deepfake technology can bypass these in real-time.
• Systemic Fragility: If the system is bypassed by a minor, the "safety" it guarantees is nullified. Yet, for it to even attempt to work, the privacy of the entire adult population must be compromised, creating a permanent "honeypot" of biometric data.
The Government's Response to the Logic Gap
The Government and child safety advocates (such as the Children's Commissioner) maintain that while no system is 100% foolproof, a "high friction" environment is sufficient to protect the majority of children:
1. Friction Over Absolute Guarantees: They argue the goal isn't a perfect shield but to make bypassing so difficult that only the most technically adept (and determined) children succeed.
2. Infrastructure-Level Checks: To avoid individual "ID uploads," some 2026 proposals suggest SIM-based verification, where your mobile network confirms your age to the VPN automatically. However, this still requires the mobile network to have "identified" you first.
3. Jurisdictional Enforcement: Ofcom is attempting to fine foreign sites (like 4chan, which was reportedly fined £20,000 in late 2025) to force compliance. However, foreign-owned VPNs often argue they are outside UK jurisdiction, leaving a massive loophole for anyone who can find an "offshore" service.
Current Standing (2026)
The Children's Wellbeing and Schools Bill amendment remains in "ping-pong" between the Lords and the Commons as of late January 2026. The Commons has the power to reject the VPN ban if they decide the logical and technical "safety" arguments do not outweigh the mass surveillance of adults. A final report from Ofcom on the effectiveness of these age-assurance tools is expected by June 2026.
Q: Right, but they're focusing on requiring or obligating *adults*. The issue isn't with adults, it's with minors. For minors to be verified as being minors they *must* submit identifying information *to the internet* - while a given service may be secure, connections are *never direct*, regardless of SSL (https), any 'hop' in the validation process is a chink in the chain of custody. So again, logically, the system presupposes anyone that does not identify themselves is a minor, meaning *anyone* doing that is, by that same logic, a minor - there is *no* child database to verify claims against (and again, that's notwithstanding that were such a database to exist, it defeats the entire purpose of "child safety" by existing as a centralise repository of data on children, Government 'owned' or not.
As of January 2026, the logical critique you've raised—that "safety" for children is achieved by mandating a breach of privacy for children and adults alike—is the primary focus of the legal and ethical challenge to the Children's Wellbeing and Schools Bill.
The Government's proposed system relies on a central logical assumption: anyone who is unverified is legally treated as a minor.
1. The "Default Minor" Presumption
The legislation does not require a "child database" because it works through exclusion. In this framework:
• The Adult Obligation: Adults must proactively prove they are not children by submitting identifying data (biometrics or ID) to a third-party validator.
• The Child's Position: Any user who cannot or will not provide this proof is automatically restricted by the VPN or platform.
• The Privacy Trade-off: Logically, for a child to prove they are a child (to access child-safe versions of apps, for instance), they must submit data to the internet. This creates the "chink in the chain" you mentioned, where sensitive data of the most vulnerable is processed across multiple digital "hops".
2. The Infrastructure of "Guaranteed" Compliance
To address the fact that systems cannot 100% guarantee identity, the government is moving away from simple "ID uploads" toward Highly Effective Age Assurance (HEAA).
• Liveness Checks: To defeat "4Chan-style" spoofing (using screenshots or game characters), Ofcom now mandates real-time biometric "liveness" tests, requiring users to perform actions during a scan to prove they are a physical person.
• Third-Party Intermediaries: The Government argues that by using "double-blind" tokens, the VPN never sees your ID and the ID-checker never sees your browsing. However, critics argue this still requires a centralized repository of data that pre-supposes the safety of the verification company itself.
3. The "Chain of Custody" Conflict
You are correct that no connection is truly "direct." In 2026, privacy advocates (like the Open Rights Group) have highlighted that:
• Verification as Surveillance: By requiring a check for every session or new app, the state creates a "Digital ID by stealth".
• Insecure Workarounds: Many argue that by banning legitimate, secure VPNs for minors, the law pushes children toward unregulated, "free" VPNs that are often designed to harvest data or serve malware, actually decreasing child safety in the name of enforcing it.
Current Status (January 2026)
Following the Lords' vote on January 21, 2026, the Bill has moved to the House of Commons. MPs are currently debating these exact logical flaws, with a government consultation active until April 2026 to determine if the "blunt instrument" of a VPN ban can be refined into a model that doesn't necessitate mass surveillance.
Cont...
#72
News / Optimising AI Generated Models...
Last post by kat - January 25, 2026, 02:53:53 PM
"Optimising AI Generated Models for 3D Printing" https://www.katsbits.com/codex/optimising-ai-models-3d-printing/ taking a look at working around the limitations AI generated models and 'optimising' them for 3D printing.
#73
News / Install Blender 5.0 to MacOS (...
Last post by kat - January 23, 2026, 11:08:13 AM
"Install Blender 5.0 to MacOS (Macbook Air/Pro etc.)" https://www.katsbits.com/codex/install-blender-5-macbook/ quick look at installing Blender 5.0 to MacOS devices - MacBook Air/Pro/etc. (non-Intel).
#74
News / Blender 5.x & Backface Culling...
Last post by kat - January 10, 2026, 06:58:00 PM
"Blender 5.x & Backface Culling in Cycles" https://www.katsbits.com/codex/blender-5-backface-culling/ taking a quick updated look at enabling backface culling using Cycles render in Blender 5.0...
#75
News / Import Minecraft Worlds or Blo...
Last post by kat - January 05, 2026, 09:09:47 AM
"Import Minecraft Worlds or Blocks into Blender" https://www.katsbits.com/codex/import-minecraft-world-blender/ taking a look at exporting worlds/blocks from Minecraft & importing them into Blender 3D, plus other tips to keep an eye on...
#76
FAQ on games, gaming & IT / UPDATE: TikTok LIVE Camera Req...
Last post by kat - January 01, 2026, 11:06:43 AMUPDATE: with recent updates to TikTok Studio, the settings to configure the 'greenscreen' camera workaround that enables live streaming without a physical camera (thus avoiding concerns over revealing identity information, Ed.) have been moved. The options are now under Background, found within Camera properties.
How To Set Up A TikTok Greenscreen
To set up a greenscreen in TikTok now, once a Camera entity has been added to the Sources panel on the left-hand side of TikTok Studio, click the 'cog' icon [1] to access Camera (properties) window overlay. Here, click Background [2], then on the Cutout 'thumbnail' [3]. In the panel now available below, set;
- "Chroma key" (enable).
- "Removal color", type or select a value e.g. "00FF00" (Hex) or "0, 255, 0" (RGB) for green [4].
Depending on the image being broadcast as a Virtual Camera from OBS, the 'camera' [5] should then appear partially or fully transparent in TikTok Studio depending on the greenscreen image.
Enabling the TikTok greenscreen in Background options.
After Camera options have been set the camera source widget will be tranparent.
QuoteAside: for the TikTok greenscreen to work, a Virtual Camera is needed alongside a 'greenscreen' image. See "TikTok Live Studio CAMERA requirement - workaround" for full details on creating the greenscreen image and setting that up in OBS.
How To Set Up A TikTok Greenscreen
To set up a greenscreen in TikTok now, once a Camera entity has been added to the Sources panel on the left-hand side of TikTok Studio, click the 'cog' icon [1] to access Camera (properties) window overlay. Here, click Background [2], then on the Cutout 'thumbnail' [3]. In the panel now available below, set;
- "Chroma key" (enable).
- "Removal color", type or select a value e.g. "00FF00" (Hex) or "0, 255, 0" (RGB) for green [4].
Depending on the image being broadcast as a Virtual Camera from OBS, the 'camera' [5] should then appear partially or fully transparent in TikTok Studio depending on the greenscreen image.
QuoteAside: the greenscreen image itself can be entirely green, or another easily removeable primary colour, or partially green, creating a 'mask' or 'cutout' as the camera.
#77
News / Bake Vertex Colors in Blender
Last post by kat - December 28, 2025, 07:33:28 PM
"Bake Vertex Color in Blender" https://www.katsbits.com/codex/bake-vertex-color/ taking a quick look at how to Bake Vertex Colors painted to an object/mesh in Blender 3D.
#78
Blog / UPDATE #4 - Cloudflare, AI Bot...
Last post by kat - December 27, 2025, 02:48:38 PM
Update 4 on the continuing saga that is Bot Defence Ultra 2000!
In the on-going efforts to mitigate 'aggressive bot traffic' across KatsBits, Cloudflare was set up to act as an authoritative middleman that validates traffic; good (humans) get through, bad (bots) get blocked.
There's more to the story, which will be relayed at a later date, but suffice to say here, regions previously hard blocked from accessing KatsBits should now be able to browse through KatsBits without issue. So, creators in China, Russia, India, Singapore and other areas often hot beds of 'errant' bot activities should have full access once past the Cloudflare 'human' check.
While this does means being reliant, or centralising to a degree, on a third-party, right now this set up is the only practical solution that makes a dent in the aggressive intrusions of AI bots, scrapers and farming scripts that hoover up content for AI training - 'copyright' is the least of our worries when it comes to AI.
Anywho, as before this does mean KatsBits needs your support so drop by Ko-Fi or Patreon. And of course if you still have trouble accessing KatsBits don't hesitate to get in touch or send an alert on Discord or DMs via The Socials(TM) - "KatsBits" everywhere.
#79
News / Optimising AI Generated 3D Mod...
Last post by kat - December 21, 2025, 04:00:35 PM
"Optimising AI Generated 3D Models" https://www.katsbits.com/codex/optimising-ai-generated-3d-models/ AI generated 3D models aren't 'game friendly' so here's a quick look at optimising AI generated objects in Blender.
#80
Blog / Re: SCAM WARNING - Sexploitati...
Last post by kat - December 11, 2025, 11:32:10 AM1PL78niSX7mP6NK49TnNFhxGHmPzEpZwby